


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
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25 October 1965


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Indonesia: Sukarno's thrust at the 23 October meeting of regional officials was clearly directed at undercutting the army's political assertiveness and its anti-Communist campaign.

He reiterated orders he had issued on 21 October aimed at stopping civilian demonstrations and the army's anti-Communist press effort. He told regional administrators to "implement without reservation" the commands and orders of the President.

Sukarno strongly implied his desire to reconstitute the Communist Party. He said that NASAKOM--his acronym for the political fusion of nationalist, religious, and Communist concepts--had become the "soul of the Indonesian people" before the Communist Party existed.

First Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio, who is also foreign minister, made his first major political statement since the coup attempt. He alluded to accusations that he was involved in the plot, but pointed out that he had been in North Sumatra in the company of a high-ranking army officer when he heard news of the coup. He asserted that he could "never become an opportunist" and had so pledged to President Sukarno. (

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[redacted] the army's biggest single mistake was to allow Subandrio to return to Djakarta and resume his close relationship with Sukarno. Subandrio is said to be working feverishly to produce evidence incriminating the army in anti-Sukarno activity and to convince Sukarno of its validity.]

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India-Pakistan: The situation remains basically unchanged as both sides prepare for a new round of diplomatic skirmishing.

Pakistan is expected to renew its charges at a UN Security Council meeting tentatively scheduled for this afternoon that Indian forces are preparing to launch a fresh attack south of the Punjab. Rawalpindi probably will also throw in charges of Indian "genocide" in Kashmir. Underlying these accusations is the Pakistani concern that UN efforts to sort out the Kashmir problem are beginning to bog down, and that new impetus is urgently needed.

New Delhi, on the other hand, continues to insist that the cease-fire must be "effective" before progress can be made on the withdrawal of opposing forces and substantive talks on Kashmir--the next two stages of the 20 September UN cease-fire resolution. In a speech yesterday Prime Minister Shastri criticized Pakistan for trying to "mix up" these stages. New Delhi had earlier protested to the UN Secretary General that Pakistani forces were responsible for 28 violations and incidents along the cease-fire line last week.

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NOTES

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Burundi: The situation throughout the country remains explosive, although widespread tribal disturbances have subsided in some sections of the interior. Isolated incidents will probably continue and most units of the small Burundian Army and gendarmerie are being held in Bujumbura to defend the capital. Arrests of Hutu leaders are continuing, however, and new outbreaks of fighting may occur if the government executes them in public as planned.

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Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

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The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

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